Some thoughts after the CAC meeting on 5/24, with guests Janice Stroh, Karen Simpkins present to talk about security on campus, the master key ring, and thefts from academic buildings. This is not a report on the meeting.
The administration seems paralyzed in dealing with the rash of thefts on campus beyond exhorting the community that “everyone is responsible for security” and that administration is planning on paying a consulting firm to do a comprehensive analysis of EMU’s security in the near future. Oh, and the purchase of the “lo-jack” for laptops (I forget the name of the system). (Why a perp couldn’t change the BIOS settings to boot from CD, reformat the disk, then install a new OS, I don’t know. It’s what I would do if I were a bad guy and wanted the laptop for myself. Or just pawn it a hundred miles away and caveat emptor.)
My perception of the reason for the administration paralysis is that 1) they don’t know whether the theft of the master key ring is actually involved in the current thefts, 2) if it is the master key ring that’s involved, then the cost of rekeying all campus doors seems prohibitive, 3) no apparent pattern in the thefts. At least they say that they have analyzed the data for patterns, but their manner of delivering that statement did not fill me with confidence. Also, don’t forget, friends, that
administration did spend $900K on security in response to the theft of the master key ring and look at where we are now.
Naturally, they don’t want to throw money at a problem that is not solved by just catching money — their idea now is to give money to a consulting firm that will tell them what to do. Is this plan CYA or is it prudent? I know which way I’d vote, but you may have a different opinion.
Also, they can’t say that the stolen master ring was not involved in the student murder on campus because we know that they don’t know that. And, because of the “no reason to suspect foul play” statement, no one would completely believe them anyway — that’s what happens when trust is violated. It takes a long time to repair that damage.
Faculty at the CAC meeting yesterday were dismayed that there appears to be no intention of doing anything in the short term (before the consulting firm, which hasn’t been chosen yet, has done its analysis, formulated its recommendations, the university has evaluated the recommendations, decided which ones to implement, then implemented the top few before running short on money — two years do you think?). On the other hand, my perception is that administration thinks faculty are a bunch of cry-babies who do so (!) leave their offices unlocked and who don’t understand that the university isn’t made of money. Continuing with my perception of the administration viewpoint, they’ve already spent $900K, they don’t have money to waste and they want to make prudent decisions that won’t backfire on them.
Let’s first look at where the $900K went (in no particular order). My comments immediately follow in parens — you’ll have your own opinions I’m sure.
- Installing cameras and recording media –video maybe? I actually don’t know the medium. (Of uncertain effectiveness because some cameras, at least, are poorly positioned.)
- Security stations — marked by blue lights and directly linked to DPS (very good idea)
- Re-keying outside doors of campus buildings for electronic swipe (very good idea)
- Re-keying dorm buildings and dorm rooms (very good idea — though I understand that it took way too long to complete the rekeying).
- Uniformed and armed private security guards patrolling campus buildings. Administrators believe this did reduce crime on campus while it was in effect. (possibly a good idea at the time for PR and to soothe campus fears; but in retrospect it was pretty darn expensive for a short term solution, and I personally don’t think it was all that effective as a deterrent).
Well, in the interests of moving things along in a more productive direction, let me make a few suggestions to administration, ordered by expense, for their consideration as possible short term steps to the security problem of thefts from academic buildings.
- Include faculty and students in your strategizing — partly for the proper representation of faculty and student interests (AKA “input”), but also because faculty and students are smart people who, at Eastern anyway, have a goodly amount of common sense. Free. Plus improves good will in the EMU community.
- Do some research: contact other universities (e.g., Wayne State) that have a problem with crime. See what their solutions have been and what consulting companies, if any, they’ve had success with. This suggestion came from M. Shichtman (Eng) or E. Martin (Poli Sci), I forget which, and it’s brilliant. And free.
- Really do look at the data on the thefts. Is there a single or a very few master keys implicated? Why have some floors not been hit at all and others have been hit repeatedly? Who’s quit or has been fired in the last two years with access to the keys involved? Whatever. Ask some questions of the data and see what falls out. Free.
- Systematic publishing of campus crimes. Archive the information on EMU’s website. M. Higbee’s suggestion and a very good one. Trivial cost.
- Ask ROTC cadets to wear their fatigues or dress uniforms on campus more often. Subsidize their cleaning cost. If uniformed guards worked before, as the administration thinks, uniformed cadets should work as almost as well. Cheap.
- Work-study students in uniform doing patrol — like SEEUS but in better uniforms. Moderate cost. Personally, I don’t think the uniformed guards that were paid out of the $900K did any good at all beyond the cosmetic. I don’t think uniformed ROTC cadets or student patrols will reduce theft either. But I confess to enjoying seeing them in uniform. (I also like seeing the nuns in full habit. It’s a uniform thing, I think.)
- Add webcams. Fix the positioning of current cameras so they’re all effective. Put the cameras on a campus digital network if they’re not already there. Moderate cost, and will vary with how many cameras are installed. It’s cheaper than you might think. Say 100 cameras at $50 a camera (I would buy way cheaper myself and plan on a replacement every couple of years), $5000. I don’t know what the networking and storage would cost. Probably not as much as one might think because the campus is wireless and buildings are pretty well wired already. Say $10000 as a guess. Moderate cost.
- Re-key, immediately, the lock of any room that has been stolen from. In the last two years that’s, what?, 50 doors. 50 * $400 = $20,000. More than one office has been stolen from multiple times so it’s not a futile move. Moderate cost.
- Re-key, immediately, the locks of departments (or halls, or floors) where there have been thefts. Biology and English come to mind as having been targeted. This is starting to get into real money, say $200K.
So there you go, administration. A few suggestions of a character less draconian than complete re-keying. Commenters will have additional, and probably better, suggestions. Just because we don’t have money doesn’t mean nothing can be done. The private sector is useful, but it’s not the only place to look for answers.
I don’t like that EMU is dithering on this. It seems straightforward to me: The keys were stolen; we didn’t inform the community as well as we could have; we spent lots of money trying to shore up security; we don’t know if the loss of the master key ring is related to physical attacks on students or to the current crop of thefts; we’re taking the following steps … (not including the steps involving dithering and delaying for consultants). Stop circling the wagons.
Susan,
Your comments are wise and practical. The only thing controversial about what you suggest, I think, is that management has already refused to listen to such input.
The willingness of the Welch hall gang – both its old members and its newest recruits – to undermine the morale of the EMU staff and faculty is amazing. Keys to our offices were stolen, and we weren’t told in clear terms of that vulnerability, and robberies occur, and faculty get upset, and the Welch hall gang doesn’t understand why we care. Of course, Welch hall officials have staff in their front offices to keep undesirables away from their doors — which is not true in most academic departments.
And to add, those in Welch have staff to sit in front, AND their locks were changed anyway, apparently (that info was correct, right?). And there have been no reported thefts or personal attacks there that we are aware of, either.
And _their_ area was rekeyed, right, per the work orders summarized earlier.
All common sense solutions, Susan. As I recall, the uniformed/private security guards were on campus shortly after the sexual assault on campus in 2006; I could be wrong about that though.
What strikes me as interesting– and, um, kinda dumb– is that the administration hasn’t publicized until now that they have done some things to try and make things better. I just don’t know why they wouldn’t be promoting that.
Well, we will see how this all plays out. As someone who has signed on to the recent grievance on this, I have a vested interest. Also, as soon as I finally get caught up on my spring term teaching, I’m going to do a little research on the robbery from my own obvious, starting by tracking down the police report. I’ll let folks know what I find out.
“Also, they can’t say that the stolen master ring was not involved in the student murder on campus because we know that they don’t know that.”
I don’t understand this statement. The dorms were completely re-keyed after the keys were stolen, it may have taken time but it was definitely completed before December so how could the stolen master-keys have had anything to do with this at all?
Love your ideas, Susan. Might I suggest an addition to your use of ROTC cadets in uniform: Work with ROTC to provide regular patrols of uniformed cadets and make sure they are equipped with radios to report suspicious activity and that those reports will get immediate response from DPS or YPD. Ypsilanti Police are doing civilian patrols involving its Volunteer Services Corp, and I’m sure they’d be willing to help get this set up. It would provide valuable experience for ROTC cadets and more eyes and ears on the alert.
Re the consulting firm: as in anything else, there are good ones and bad ones. An experienced firm with a proven track record could probably punch holes in EMU security and show them how to improve dramatically so that every dollar counts. The trick will be to get administration to actually move on this. Or course, there’s always that TV show where the reformed burglars break in and clean out a house, then show the owners how to secure the place. Maybe we should invite them in and film a break-in. National exposure should motive the admins. ;^)
Mom2One –
You say that the dorms were all rekeyed prior to Dec. 2006.
What’s your evidence for that conclusion? Management officials assert this, but they have not produced the work orders, with proof of when the work was done, that could prove this. And yet physical plant staff representatives promised to produce such documentation for members of the Security Advisory Committee well over a month ago; but they have not yet kept their promise to provide this documentation. So, as far as I can tell, the claim is not backed by evidence — and in a campus that is rift with rumor and fear, and at a place where the outright deceptions of management that have been documented are numerous, one would be wise to question all assertions made by management that aren’t supported with evidence. Especially when evidence was promised to be forthcoming, and it wasn’t.
This might not mean that there is a cover up of when the Hill Hall locks were changed. But why risk letting anything smell like a cover up? Two possible reasons – if there is an actual cover up, or, because the default choice of management is to withhold information and to refuse to answer questions. I think the 2nd scenario prevails here, but even that is very regrettable.
Change the SEEUS into a group that patrols all around campus, preventing crime by their doing so. Presently the huddle in groups of 4 or 5 by the door to the Halle Library or the C.O.B. Their purpose is to lead a few scared souls through a “dangerous” area while doing little to make it safer.
When I was a student at UC San Diego, sophomores could steal a fire extingusher from a building, have fun for the evening, re-charge it and return it. There was absolutely no fear of getting caught. There were no “SEEUS” types and the police were scarce and stayed in cars.
Then I attended UCLA, who had “SEEUS” types who were involved in active patrols of the campus, in pairs or alone. One would come around a corner at all sorts of random times. I would see them everywhere and at all times at night. I almost had the feeling that if I tossed a gum wrapper on the ground, I’d get caught. They were very effective at preventing crime by being a great deterrent. They could call each other or the UCLA police.
They were the eyes and ears of the UCLA police who could arrive within a minute or two.
Can we please put to rest the rumor that the murderer/rapist of Laura Dickinson used the master keys to gain access to her room? At the very least Hill Hall was re-keyed in mid-to-late July 2006 – I was living in that dorm at the time.
Okay, so to most of you I’m just a random person posting on this blog – you don’t really have any way of verifying that I’m telling the truth (except what a lame thing for me to lie about!). The university should produce the work orders, etc like Mike mentioned above, but in the meantime let’s focus on legitimate, verifiable complaints (ie, the lack of producing the work orders, the likelihood that the missing keys may play a part in the faculty office thefts etc).
Well put, Angela.
Clearly, the administration has screwed up in a wide variety of ways– the faculty union contract negotiations, the lost keys, and trying to cover up the Dickinson murder. These are all bad things. But the problem I have– and this is what you are getting at– is the desire to neatly connect these three different events into one narrative.
I think one could argue that these and other failures represent a “pattern” that really needs to be addressed in upper administration. But that these things are directly connected– e.g., the administration screwed up the lost key thing and therefore that killed Dickinson, or the administration screwed up the contract, were distracted, and therefore that killed Dickinson– is just not true. In fact, it rings to me a wee bit too much like the “everything is connected” conspiracies of shows like *The X-Files.*
Thanks, sitedad.
I think the lack of information about the missing keys and re-keying efforts can definitely be used as evidence of the pattern you mentioned. I also think that the rumors like this that have sprung up can be held against the administration. When people don’t have enough information, especially if they think they are missing that info because someone is withholding it, they start formulating rumors. Such rumors lead to an atmosphere of fear and even more ill-will directed towards the university. We have enough we need to legitimately be concerned about regarding safety; we don’t need rumors adding to it.